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ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Can a State Waive Its Immunity
by Removing a Case
from State to Federal Court?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 246-248. © 2002 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.,
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377, and co-author
of West's Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions (5th edition).
Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
When a state voluntarily removes a
case from state to federal court,
does it waive its Eleventh
Amendment forum immunity if
state law does not expressly autho-
rize the removing official to consent
to suit?
FACTS
Paul Lapides is a tenured assistant
professor of management and entre-
preneurship and director of the
Corporate Governance Center at
Kennesaw State University (KSU)
in Kennesaw, Ga. KSU is a unit of
the State University System of
Georgia under its Board of Regents
(Regents).
In 1997, KSU began an investigation
of Lapides after a student accused
him of sexual harassment. The uni-
versity's investigation produced no
corroborating evidence to support
the student's allegation and no
action was taken against Lapides.
He claims that as a result of the
incident, he became aware of letters
fabricated by fellow faculty mem-
bers containing defamatory state-
ments about him and the sexual
harassment accusations. Lapides
asserts that those letters, which
were circulated to others on the fac-
ulty, are now part of his personnel
file and have interfered with his eli-
gibility for various faculty positions
and promotional opportunities.
Lapides sued the Regents and indi-
vidual defendants under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the Georgia Tort Claims
Act in the Superior Court of Cobb
County, Ga. Lapides alleged that the
actions of university officials
deprived him of his right to due
process of law as well as his liberty
and property interests in practicing
his professions as guaranteed to him
by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
The Georgia Attorney General filed
a notice of removal and removed
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the case to federal court. At the
same time, he filed a motion to dis-
miss the Section 1983 claims, stat-
ing among other reasons that the
board was immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment. The dis-
trict court denied the motion and
held that the state, through its
attorney general, had waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by
removing the case to federal court
and invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal court.
The Regents appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. Reversing the district court,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Regents' removal of the suit to fed-
eral court did not constitute a waiv-
er of the state's Eleventh
Amendment immitnity. Lapides v.
Board of Regents of Univ. System of
Georgia, 251 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir.
2001). The court reasoned that a
state will be deemed to have waived
its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit only when it is stated by
the most express language or by
such overwhelming implication from
the text as would leave no room for
any other reasonable construction.
According to the Eleventh Circuit,
waiver of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity by state offi-
cials must be explicitly authorized
by the state in its constitution,
statutes, and decisions; such author-
ity is not to be presumed in the
absence of clear language to the
contrary.
The court concluded that the
Regents' removal of the suit that
was brought against it to federal
court did not constitute a waiver of
the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. It explained that the
state attorney general lacked statu-
tory authority to waive the state's
immunity and that the filing
of a removal petition would not be
construed as consent to federal
jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit instructed the
district court to hear only those
nonbarred claims over which it had
jurisdiction and to remand the oth-
ers to state court. If the district
court concluded that no nonbarred
federal questions existed, the whole
case was to be remanded to state
court.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted Lapides' petition requesting
review of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. 122 S.Ct. 456 (2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:
"The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.'"
Although it is not expressly stated
in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has held that the Eleventh
Amendment also prohibits a state
from being sued by its own citizens.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-
21 (1890).
The Supreme Court has recognized
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. First, Congress
may authorize such a suit in the
exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment-an
amendment enacted after the
Eleventh Amendment and specifi-
cally designed to alter the federal-
state balance. College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999). Second, a state may
consent to suit. Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
239-40 (1985). A state is deemed to
have waived its immunity only
when the law uses the most express
language or when there is such an
overwhelming implication from its
text as to leave no room for any
other reasonable construction. Id.
In addition, the Supreme Court has
held that the Eleventh Amendment
"is a personal privilege which [a
state] may waive at pleasure; so that
in a suit otherwise well brought, in
which a state had a sufficient inter-
est to entitle it to become a party
defendant, its appearance in a court
of the United States would be a vol-
untary submission to its jurisdic-
tion." Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1883). See also Gunter v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S.
273, 284 (1906) ("[Wlhere a state
voluntarily becomes a party to a
cause and submits its rights for judi-
cial determination, it will be bound
thereby, and cannot escape the
result of its own voluntary act by
invoking the prohibitions of the
11th Amendment.")
The Supreme Court has held that a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity by state officials must be
explicitly authorized by the state in
its constitution, statutes, and deci-
sions. Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459,
467 (1945). Such authority is not to
be presumed in the absence of clear
language to the contrary. Wisconsin
Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 393-98 (1998).
Lapides argues that the Georgia
attorney general waived Georgia's
Eleventh Amendment immunity
when he removed the case to feder-
al court and invoked federal court
jurisdiction. He explains that forfei-
tures of Eleventh Amendment
immunity by a state's litigation con-
duct are distinct from other types of
waivers. According to Lapides,
removal unambiguously evinces a
state's voluntary consent to federal
court jurisdiction. Lapides points
out that removal always requires a
state defendant's consent, even
(Continued on Page 248)
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when it stands amongst a number of
defendants. In such cases, Lapides
claims that Ford Motor's authoriza-
tion requirement is inapplicable and
suggests that the proper analysis is
whether the particular state official
had the authority to invoke federal
jurisdiction. See Gunter v. Atlantic
Coast R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 285-86
(1906). If the rule of Ford Motor is
to be applied at all, Lapides says it
must necessarily be tempered by
federal law considerations of judicial
estoppel and other equitable con-
cerns that arise when a state pur-
ports to assert federal jurisdiction
and then later disavows that choice.
The Regents argue that under Ford
Motor, litigation conduct does not
waive or forfeit immunity because
the state attorney general was not
authorized by state law to waive
immunity. Relying on Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the
Regents also argue that they were
entitled to raise the immunity issue
late in the proceeding because a
state entity may raise Eleventh
Amendment immunity at any time
in the course of the proceedings.
SIGNIFICANCE
Several circuits have addressed the
issue of the authority of a state's
attorney general to waive the state's
immunity. See, e.g., Santee Sioux
Tribe of Nebraska v. Nebraska, 121
F.3d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding there was no showing that
waiver was within the authority of
Nebraska's attorney general);
Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 645 F.2d 2,
3 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
attorney general of Louisiana had
no authority to waive the state's
immunity). But see McLaughlin v.
Board of Trustees of State Colleges
of Colorado, 215 F.3d 1168, 1171
(10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Colorado attorney general waived
the state's immunity).
In Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998),
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring
opinion, urged reconsideration of
the perceived Ford rule that immu-
nity may be raised at any time in a
proceeding. Specifically, he urged
the Court to consider either that it
is proper to "infer ... waiver from
the failure to raise the [Eleventh
Amendment] objection at the outset
of the proceedings," or that a state
entity waives immunity when,
"under no compulsion," it voluntari-
ly invokes [federal court] jurisdic-
tion," such as by removing a case to
federal court." 524 U.S. at 395.
In addition to Lapides, the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in
another case involving Eleventh
Amendment immunity. That case
(analyzed elsewhere in this issue of
PREVIEW) involves the question of
whether a state's sovereign immuni-
ty protects it from being brought
before a federal administrative tri-
bunal by a private party. South
Carolina State Ports Auth. v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 243 F.3d
165 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 122
S.Ct. 392 (2001).
The Supreme Court has the oppor-
tunity in this case to resolve the dis-
agreement among the circuits
regarding Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Additionally, the Court
may address the issues raised by
Justice Kennedy in Schacht. The
Court may reexamine the holding in
Ford Motor and Edelman permitting
the immunity defense to be raised
at any time in the proceedings. The
Court also can clarify whether it is
irrelevant that the state entity itself,
as distinguished from the state
attorney general, is authorized to
waive immunity as a matter of state
law. Lastly, the Court may deter-
mine whether a state entity invok-
ing federal court jurisdiction over a
matter waives any Eleventh
Amendment immunity against suit
in federal court.
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